


































































































  introduction 
Re-inventing the Ship in the Long 
nineteenth Century
Don Leggett and Richard Dunn
In every vessel there is a great combination of scientific skill; and never before in 
history has such marvellous complexity been brought together for the protection 
and prosperity of the human race.
in 1911, the ship owner and Member of parliament Walter Runciman praises 
members of the institution of naval Architects for their part in Britain’s maritime 
and national successes.1
Between 1800 and 1914, Britain’s ships were re-invented. the vessels Britain 
relied on for protection and prosperity altered in fundamental ways, from material 
and reliability to the methods in which they operated and in which sailors and 
non-sailors made sense of them. this volume examines these ships as objects of 
science and maritime culture, utilising a variety of analytical approaches to revisit 
historiographical debates concerning technological change and open new avenues 
of research within the history of maritime technology. this rich diversity of essays 
adds to the field of maritime studies and the emerging cultural history of the navy. 
Historians of science and technology will also find discussions of experiment, 
skill, expertise and machine users situated in the spaces and cultural contexts that 
have made these themes so important in studies of the long nineteenth century.
the authors share a co mon interest: to deepen our understanding of how the 
ship, in its many re-inv ntions, features in the history of the peoples, cultures, 
ideas and objects that surrounded and influenced it. We regard the ship as a 
practical and symbolic object, and so wish to explore dimensions that deserve 
greater attention in the social and cultural history of the maritime world. We 
unravel some key moments when the ship became an increasingly complex socio-
technological system. We also examine how a wide range of actors negotiated 
traditions, expectations and myths that surrounded this seemingly familiar object. 
We explore how the agents who constructed and culturally shaped the ship were 
‘empire builders’, inseparable from the ways their ‘inventions’ were deployed and 
the authors wish to thank Crosbie Smith and Robert Blyth for their helpful suggestions in 
writing this chapter.
1 [Walter Runciman], ‘Speeches following the Banquet at the Connaught Rooms, July 





































































































used.2 We consider how historians in these fields can examine the ship to develop 
fresh insights into existing historiographical debates and raise new questions.
the essays in this volume represent a departure from existing models of 
scholarship on the ship within maritime and naval history. Many previous histories 
separate the ship – and particularly its design and construction – from the context in 
which it found form and meaning. this is evident in technical histories of the navy, 
popular with specialist maritime history publishers. David K. Brown’s Warrior 
to Dreadnought: Warship Development, 1860–1905 (1997) is one such volume, 
rich in information and technical explanations, but light on context and historicist 
analysis of how technical changes gained authority and successive transformations 
in the British warship were commissioned.3 Such technical histories tend to isolate 
the engineering behind ships from the cultural, political and social dimensions of 
maritime and naval history.
A division between engineering and history is also drawn by accounts that 
explore the matériel of naval power. C.i. hamilton, ho examines a number of 
the important transformations of the mid-nineteenth-century warship in his Anglo-
French Naval Rivalry, 1840–1870 (1993), mentions a wide range of individuals and 
institutions connected to naval architecture and marine engineering, but not their 
work.4 Instead, the focus is on the Admiralty officials who oversaw the work of 
engineers, such as the successive First Sea Lords and Controllers of the navy. this 
focus provides hamilton with a group of actors engaged in politics, administration 
and shipbuilding policy, yet the internal dimensions of engineering culture and 
practice are absent. Jon tetsuro Sumida’s In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, 
Technology and British Naval Policy, 1889–1914 (1989) also follows this pattern, 
with its focus on technology as a component of Admiralty financial and strategic 
considerations.5 Such analysis does not contribute to our understanding of how 
new ship designs were formed and gained acceptance in the Admiralty beyond the 
level of administrative politics.
Similar approaches are to be found in maritime history. Freda harcourt, for 
example, opens Flagships of Imperialism: The P&O Company and the Politics 
of Empire from its Origins to 1867 (2006) by stating that, ‘once long-distance 
steam navigation became a technological possibility, in the second quarter of the 
2 See Ben Marsden and Crosbie Smith, Engineering Empires: A Cultural History of 
Engineering in Nineteenth-Century Britain (Basingstoke, 2005), pp. 1–11, the approach of 
which contrasts that of technological ‘factors’ and ‘impacts’ employed in John Beeler, Birth 
of the Battleship: British Capital Ship Design 1870–1881 (Chatham, 2001).
3 David K. Brown, Warrior to Dreadnought: Warship Design and Development, 
1860–1905 (London, 1997).
4 C.i. hamilton, Anglo-French Naval Rivalry, 1840–1870 (oxford, 1993), pp. 220–25.
5 Jon tetsuro Sumida, In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology and 




































































































Introduction: Re-inventing the Ship in the Long Nineteenth Century 3
nineteenth century, there was widespread pressure to develop it.’6 in similar vein, 
J. Forbes Munro’s study of the British india Steam navigation Company places 
a causal emphasis on technology: ‘the technological lead which the pioneering 
development of the iron- and steel-hulled steamship, together with successive 
innovations in marine engines … gave to British shipowners and managers 
[underlies] the growth of the mercantile marine’.7 Such faith in steam, argue 
historians of technology, was not as forthcoming as maritime historians believe. 
it took considerable inducements and experimentation to make steam credible.8
Moving away from these approaches raises a number of questions. Who drove 
the material changes to the ship that characterised navies in t e long nineteenth 
century, and why? to what extent can engineers and projectors be integrated 
into existing narratives of maritime and naval history in the long nineteenth 
century? How entwined were naval officers and the ships that were attached 
to their ‘greatness’? how did actors interested in the re-invention of the ship 
negotiate the strong cultural conservatism surrounding naval aesthetics? how did 
ships of the nineteenth century differ from other social spaces, and how has that 
shaped the maritime world?9 Addressing these issues underpins the contribution 
of this volume to the fields of maritime studies, naval history and the history of 
technology. As contributors, we have aimed to develop new approaches to the ship 
within the history of merchant shipping, naval culture, scientific discovery, ship 
operations and British literature, and offer ways of situating its re-invention and 
increasing complexity.
One way to proceed is by investigating specific spaces where the re-invention 
of the ship took place. Richard Biddle begins this geographical survey in the 
dockyard, with his chapter on the occupational health of labourers, unravelling 
the relationship between their bodies and the ships they built. through dockyard 
records and contemporary testimony, Biddle shows how the changing nature of 
ship construction made the dockyard a more (and differently) dangerous working 
environment, in need of greater regulation and healthcare provisions. Moving the 
focus to the spatial structure of the ship at sea, Anne-Flore Laloë explores the ship 
in one of its most important re-inventions – as a vessel of marine investigation. 
through her account of the non-discovery of Bathybius haeckelii, Laloë describes 
some of the lesser-known activities that took place on board hM ships in the 
nineteenth century, locating them within fierce debates about their role in the 
6 Freda harcourt, Flagships of Imperialism: The P&O Company and the Politics of 
Empire from its Origins to 1867 (Manchester, 2006), p. 1.
7 J. Forbes Munro, Maritime Enterprise and Empire: Sir William Mackinnon and his 
Business Network, 1823–1893 (Woodbridge, 2003), p. 8, quoted in Marsden and Smith, 
Engineering Empires, p. ix.
8 Marsden and Smith, Engineering Empires, pp. 88–128.
9 For recent scholarly attention to the geography of the ship, see David Lambert, 
Lucianna Martins and Miles ogborn, ‘Currents, visions and voyages: historical 





































































































production of knowledge about the oceans. Still in the Royal navy, but this time 
on the level of fleet movements, Duncan Redford investigates the Admiralty’s 
attempts to integrate the submarine with the surface fleet. Redford reveals the 
potency of the navy’s corporate culture, and in particular its dedication to 
Mahanite principles and fleetwork, which were largely incompatible with the role 
many officers in the Royal Navy desired for the submarine. Taken together, these 
chapters show Britain’s ships not as ready-made objects, but sites where human 
labour and controversy surrounded their final deployment into maritime and naval 
service.
in examining its re-invention we cannot ignore the important ways in which 
the ship also became a site for the interventions of industrial engineering and naval 
science. Many of the chapters examine the networks of engineers that played a 
major role in the re-invention of Britain’s ships. While much contemporary 
maritime and naval scholarship elevates the traditional ‘ eroes’ of exploration and 
naval combat, for many victorians the engineer could also be heroic. Christine 
MacLeod has written on the posthumous honour bestowed on James Watt as the 
emerging hero of the industrial classes. Watt became a symbol of the ‘ingenuity 
and enterprise of its [Britain’s] “industrious citizens”’ as early victorian reformers 
elevated peace and prosperity as national and personal aims.10 engineers including 
the Stephensons and Brunels became celebrated in their own lifetimes, while 
others, like the naval architect John Scott Russell, took on an increasingly public 
role in endeavours such as the Royal Society of Arts and the great exhibition. 
these individuals became central to an aspiring middle-class, liberal – even Liberal 
– model of heroism offering an alternative to the more aristocratic, military model.
engineers have taken the focu  for a number of chapters in this volume, 
not because of their heroic deeds in invention, but because the labours of their 
enterprising art and science have become celebrated components of Britain’s 
maritime past.11 Yet alongside engineers, a cast of actors including admirals, 
sailors, shipping companies, projectors and scientists, to name but a few, deployed 
the resources of industrial society to reshape the maritime technological systems 
that had once been familiar to all. in his chapter, Christopher harvie employs 
a range of literary tracings to explore the re-invention of the symbolic ship in 
industrial Britain as a link in the chains of transportation, trade and war. Don 
Leggett similarly draws attention to the imagery surrounding the ship, examining 
it as a site of poli ical debate, professional controversy (fuelled by the continuing 
professionalisation of naval architects and marine engineers during the Royal 
navy’s transition from wood to iron) and social disputes over engineering and 
naval aesthetics. through historicist readings such as these we may reconstruct the 
10 Christine MacLeod, Heroes of Invention: Technology, Liberalism and British 
Iden ity, 1750–1914 (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 1–3.
11 Christopher harvie, A Floating Commonwealth: Politics, Culture, and Technology 




































































































Introduction: Re-inventing the Ship in the Long Nineteenth Century 5
cultural contexts and social networks through which the re-invention of the ship 
was understood within Britain’s maritime community.
Fine-grained historicism, such as is presented in this volume, is central to 
contesting the three dominant models of technological change in maritime studies: 
the heroic inventor, the evolution of technology and technological determinism. 
Specific consideration of how these models operate will hopefully lead to fresh 
consideration of their continued application.
in the heroic inventor model of technological change a single individual is 
claimed to makes great leaps in innovation, seemingly apart from contemporaries, 
constraining institutions or the requirements of those who use technologies.12 
Stories about how Watt invented the steam engine, or isambard Kingdom Brunel 
invented the transport infrastructure of victorian Britain, hold little authority 
among academic historians of technology, who argue that ‘invention’ and 
‘authorship’ are spread widely across social networks, that technical innovations 
are culturally contingent and that successes and failures must be publicly 
constructed.13 nevertheless, heroic stories remain powerful cultural narratives in 
the commemoration of technology, where the sin le authorship of objects can be 
easier to understand and celebrate than the work of a complicated and expansive 
social network, within which authority, intention and identity are ‘constructed’ and 
transmitted.
the second model weaves technological change into the fabric of maritime 
history without reflexive consideration, by shrouding the agency of actors and 
the cultural specificity of technical decision making. This evolutionary model – 
which is charged with extra meaning when writing about the nineteenth century 
– suggests that technical developments follow a progressive course largely 
independent of cultural or political influences, and that these developments affect 
societies in ways that are materially dependent, rather than socially conditioned. 
S.C. Gilfillan’s classic Inventing the Ship, an account of invention that belonged 
to the 1930s Chicago school of sociology, was among the first studies to express 
such a model of why and how naval technologies altered.14 Gilfillan focused on 
the invention of specific technologies – from rudders to propellers – to provide 
a ‘rational’ explanation for technological change that remains powerful in many 
12 MacLeod, Heroes of Invention; John M. Staudenmaier, Technology’s Storytellers: 
Reweaving the Human Fabric (Cambridge, Mass., 1985).
13 Mari  Biagioli and peter galison, ‘introduction’, in Mario Biagioli and peter 
galison (eds), Scientific Authorship: Credit and Intellectual Property in Science (new 
York, 2003), pp. 1–9; Crosbie Smith and Anne Scott, ‘“Trust in Providence”: Building 
Confidence into the Cunard Line of Steamers’, Technology and Culture, 48 (2007): pp. 
471–96; Ben Marsden, ‘Blowing Hot and Cold: Reports and Retorts on the Status of the 
Air-engine as Success or Failure, 1830–1855’, History of Science, 36 (1998): pp. 373–420.
14 S.C. Gilfillan, Inventing the Ship: A Study of the Inventions Made in her History 





































































































historical analyses.15 Gilfillan’s account of ‘form[s] of evolution so obvious, 
simple and uneventful, that they would seem to demand hardly any inventive 
ability’ maintains a hold on scholarship, although this articulation of the model 
may be unfamiliar to those who employ it.16
Still more pervasive in maritime studies is the notion of technological 
determinism: the reduction of technology to that of a ‘factor’ determining the 
grand narratives of maritime expansion and naval supremacy; for example, the 
onset of steam engineering as a determinant of Britain’s global expansion. inherent 
in this model is the assertion that technology, and its intrinsic characteristics, affect 
change in an inevitable way that necessitates action in the surrounding world, 
often reducing the complexities in a group’s interaction with technology. too few 
historians will be familiar with the debates and concerns regarding determinism that 
take place within the history of technology. Indeed, reflexive practitioners such as 
John Staudenmaier believe that the marginalisation of history of technology from 
the ‘mainstream’ has much to do with its sensitivity to soft determinism. tracing in 
detail the social and technical constructions of technologies that are treated among 
mainstream historians as ‘finished’ objects may, Staudenmaier writes, ‘offer dull 
fare to outsiders. they fail to excite interest precisely because their study seems 
too neat, too enclosed and abstracted from history’s turbulence’.17
Models of technological determinism actively marginalise technology as an 
uncomplicated agent of change, assigning it to the function of a mere ‘factor’ 
in the explanation of political, social, cultural and economic transformation.18 A 
deterministic account offers an appealing way for historians to build technology 
into other narratives, as a factor that enabled change, without examining the deeper 
questions on which the construction and authority of that technology depended.19 
Considerable insights can be gained, however, by examining the settings, spaces 
and contexts in which technol gical changes were fostered and subsequently 
transformed into reforms. oliver Carpenter employs notions of trust to explore the 
function of civic conduct, religious outlook and public imagery in the shipowning 
practices of the Robinson Line (later Stag Line). Carpenter demonstrates how 
shipping companies – and particularly the much overlooked tramp companies 
that formed the backbone of the British mercantile empire – developed layered 
networks of trust to gain credibility for their maritime business.
15 For a critique of rational explanations and cultural norms, see peter Burke, What is 
Cultural History? (Cambridge, 2004), p. 2.
16 Gilfillan, Inventing the Ship, p. 17.
17 John M. Staudenmaier, ‘Rationality versus Contingency in the history of 
technology’, in Merrit Roe Smith and Leo Marx (eds), Does Technology Drive History? 
(Cambridge, MA, 1994), pp. 259–73, at p. 261.
18 See Leo Marx and Merritt Roe Smith, ‘introduction’, in Smith and Marx, Does 
Technology Drive History?, pp. ix–xv.
19 See, for example, Daniel headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European 




































































































Introduction: Re-inventing the Ship in the Long Nineteenth Century 7
in the same vein, important insights can be gleaned by investigating the vital 
and yet so often compartmentalised engineering practices needed to see the plans of 
shipowners realised. Crosbie Smith examines the relationships between Admiralty 
master shipwrights, shipyard naval architects and company directors in the Royal 
Mail Steam Packet Company’s ambitious plan to build a fleet of 14 steamers. 
Smith specifically draws attention to the spatial distinctions and dynamics 
between ‘sites of political, social and economic action’ to demonstrate how the 
authority to alter ship designs shifts during the shipbuilding process. Similarly 
interested in engineering practices, Richard Dunn reveals in his study of William 
thomson’s (later Lord Kelvin’s) magnetic compass and mechanical depth sounder 
how the changing use of these instruments and their onboard location reveal much 
about the development of ship operations. the transformation of the ship into an 
increasingly complex technological system was a product of engineers, sailors 
and Admiralty officials interacting together with scientific instruments. Taken 
together, these case studies demonstrate that the engineering practices at the heart 
of technological systems can reveal important ways in which actors sought to take 
control of ship design and operations.
in the penultimate chapter of this volume, technological change in the navy 
is placed within the national cultural context through the comparison of British 
shipbuilding with American exceptionalism. William M. McBride presents a 
selection of episodes in Anglo-American technical relations to highlight the unique 
cultural, historic and strategic dimensions of their respective approaches to ship 
design. Finally, in his epilogue, Andrew Lambert reflects on the themes developed 
in the volume to explore how responses to science and technology destabilised 
long-held attitudes and ideas in the maritime world. From the changing depiction 
of the ship in marine paintings to the politics of ship design, Lambert pursues 
nineteenth-century perceptions of maritime and naval technology to uncover the 
role of history and tradition in how Britons understood technological changes. 
‘the link between science, technology, ships and engines, and art, culture, history 
and politics is hard to define,’ Lambert notes, ‘and lacks the predictable linearity 
of histories constrained by a qualifying prefix, but it promises far richer insights.’
thus the chapters in this volume seek to move debates about science and 
technology in the Royal and merchant navies away from ‘factors’, ‘impacts’ and 
‘evolutions’. We make this transition by changing the nature of the discussion 
and recasting technical questions that warrant consideration more appropriately 
as social, spatial and cultural ones. instead of debating ‘factors’, this volume’s 
contributors promote discussions about the culture of science and technology in the 
maritime world that aspire to integrate technical and material issues with political 
and social ones. And instead of exploring the material ‘evolution’ of technology, 
we examine how the peculiarities of Britain’s maritime cultures shaped technology. 
in pursuing these threads, this collection deliberately avoids prescribing a single, 
controlling perspective on technological change, providing instead a range of 
approaches with which historians might integrate technologies that otherwise seem 
to be ‘mere cogs’ into a broader framework of maritime and naval studies.
